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I. INTRODUCTION
he Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA)1 represents the first major attempt on a
national level to address the problem of abandoned hazardous waste
sites.2 Primarily through the imposition of a tax upon the sale of certain
* Associate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A. 1977, Washington & Lee
University; J.D., 1980, Duke University.
** Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio. A.B. 1965, John Carroll Univer-
sity; J.D., 1968, University of Notre Dame.
' Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)(codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601- 9657 (Supp. V 1981)).
' The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (1976) (42 U.S.C. current version at §§ 6901-6986 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (hereinafter
cited as RCRA], provided for the establishment of a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory program
covering the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
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chemicals,' Congress created the Hazardous Substance Response Trust
Fund, commonly known as the "Superfund,'" 4 to finance the cleanup of
the nation's worst hazardous waste sites.' CERCLA permits an action to
be brought in federal court for recovery of amounts disbursed from the
Superfund against, inter alia, any person who arranges for treatment or
disposal of wastes at a site, typically the generator of the hazardous
wastes.' In addition, the government may seek injunctive relief in federal
court to abate an "imminent and substantial endangerment" prior to the
expenditure of Superfund monies.7
CERCLA's enforcement provisions contain numerous ambiguities and
apparent inconsistencies on issues that directly affect the potential liabil-
ity of CERCLA's defendants. Many of the inadequacies probably can be
traced to the last-minute compromise which led to the passage of the
statute.8 The Act's checkered legislative history has led one court to
remark:
CERCLA was created in a unique attempt by Congress to miti-
gate some of the problems caused by inactive hazardous waste
sites. It was hastily, and, therefore inadequately drafted. Even the
legislative history must be read with caution since last minute
changes in the bill were inserted with little or no explanation. Be-
cause of the haste with which CERCLA was enacted, Congress
wastes. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-265 (1983). Section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp.
V 1981), authorizes the government to bring suit to restrain persons contributing to activi-
ties which "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment." Courts have ruled that this provision does not reach off-site generators of aban-
doned waste. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text. Congress later enacted
CERCLA in an attempt to allow the inclusion of this group within the scope of government
enforcement actions See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109, 114 n.12a (D.N.J.
1983).
1 CERCLA § 211 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4662 (Supp. V 1981)).
4 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. V 1981). Congress also authorized direct annual appropria-
tions of $33 million for each of the first five years of the Superfund program. Id.
§ 9631(b)(2). The final component of the Superfund consists of funds which had been previ-
ously committed to a spill cleanup fund created as part of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(3)(Supp. V 1981).
8 The government is authorized to respond to the actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance pursuant to § 104 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp- V 1981). See
infra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
6 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1981). See inira notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 111-116 and accompanying text.
8 The final version of CERCLA was passed by Congress on December 3, 1980. H.R.
7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 1IIl,802 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). It was primarily
the product of three different Superfund bills: (1) H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
(2) H.R. 85, 96th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1979); (3) S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
17989-94 (1979). For a discussion of Congress' consideration of these bills and the genesis of
the law as enacted, see Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
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was not able to provide a clarifying committee report, thereby
making it extremely difficult to pinpoint the intended scope of
the legislation.'
The net effect of inadequate drafting and consideration of Superfund leg-
islation is that the task of forging meaningful standards for liability under
the final product is left largely to the courts.
This Article discusses the significant legal issues which arise in govern-
ment enforcement actions regarding the imposition of liability under
CERCLA, and examines the role that courts have played in developing
applicable standards of liability. This Article also examines the state of
the law in the context of two common scenarios: (a) actions under sec-
tion 107 of CERCLA for recovery of costs of response at a hazardous
waste site; and (b) actions under section 106 of CERCLA for injunctive
relief. Finally this Article addresses: (1) who may be held liable; (2) under
what conditions liability may arise; (3) what standard for liability exists;
and (4) the extent of potential liability.1
' United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (citations omitted).
Nearly every major CERCLA decision to date contains similar comments. For example, the
district court in United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983), stated:
[CERCLA] leaves much to be desired from a syntactical standpoint, perhaps a
reflection of the hasty compromises which were reached as the bill was pushed
through Congress just before the close of its 96th Session. Any attempt to divine
the legislative intent behind many of its provisions will inevitably involve a resort
to the Act's legislative history. Unfortunately, the legislative history is unusually
riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements.
Id. at 1331. See also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("CERCLA is in fact a hastily drawn piece of compro-
mise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions."); United States v. A
& F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984) ("The final version of the Act
was conceived by an ad hoc committee of Senators who fashioned a last minute compromise
which enabled the Act to pass. As a result, the statue was hastily and inadequately drafted."
(footnote omitted)); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 n.12 (N.D.
Ohio 1983) ("CERCLA was rushed through a lame duck session of Congress, and therefore,
might not have received adequate drafting. In fact, during the final House debates, a num-
ber of Congressmen identified over forty drafting errors in the bill which became CER-
CLA."); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn.
1982) ("Due to the legislative history of the act, the Committee Reports must be read with
some caution."); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) ("The statute itself is vague and its legislative history indefinite .... What was
enacted and signed into law is a severely diminished piece of compromise legislation from
which a number of significant features were deleted.").
"0 The issue of relative liabilities among "off-site generators" and other defendants in
CERCLA cases is beyond the scope of this Article and is discussed elsewhere in this Issue.
See Moore, When is One Generator Liable for Another's Waste?, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
(1984).
1984-85]
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II. GENERAL STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Generally, section 104 of CERCLA" authorizes the President or his
designee 2 to undertake response action' s using monies from the
Superfund whenever there is an actual or a threatened release"' of a haz-
ardous substance"8 into the environment."' The response actions may in-
clude investigation of a hazardous waste site, emergency removal of haz-
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp. V 1981).
" Section 115 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (Supp. V 1981), authorizes the President
to delegate any powers granted to him under the Act. Pursuant to the section, President
Reagan issued Order No. 12316 on August 14, 1981 to delegate these powers to various
government agencies. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981). The bulk of those powers, including
cleanup authority under § 104 of the Act, were delegated to the Administrator of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA). Id. at 42,237-40. Section 8(g) of this Order revoked
previous Exec. Order No. 12286, 46 Fed. Reg. 9,901 (1981), which had been issued by Presi-
dent Carter shortly before he left office. Id. at 42,240.
" Response actions are divided into "removal" and "remedial action." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(25)(Supp. V 1981). Removal relates primarily to the cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances released into the environment and includes evaluation of the threat or extent of a
release. Id. § 9601(23). Remedial action relates to permanent measures taken in response to
a release or threatened release. Id. § 9601(24).
11 "Release" is defined by § 101(22) of the Act to include "any spilling, leaking, pump-
ing, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or dis-
posing into the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(Supp. V 1981).
"o Hazardous substances under CERCLA include a broad range of substances identified
under other federal environment laws including: (1) any substance designated pursuant to
§ 311(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A)(1982); (2) any
waste listed as a hazardous waste or having the characteristics of a hazardous waste identi-
fied under § 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (Supp. V 1981);
(3) any toxic pollutant listed under § 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1982); (4) any hazardous air pollutant listed under § 112 of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981); and (5) any imminently hazardous chemical sub-
stance or mixture with respect to which EPA has taken action pursuant to § 7 of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(Supp. V 1981).
Identification of these substances has and will be provided. Regulations identifying these
substances has been promulgated at: (1) 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 (1983) (designating hazardous
substances under §311(b)(2)(A) of Federal Water Pollution Control Act); (2) 40 C.F.R.
§§ 261.20-.24, .30-.33 (1983) (designating certain solid wastes as hazardous wastes); (3) 40
C.F.R. § 401.15 (1983) (toxic pollutants designated under Federal Water Pollution Control
Act); and (4) 40 C.F.R. § 61 (1983) (designating hazardous air pollutants). Section 102 of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (Supp. V 1981), authorizes EPA to identify as additional haz-
ardous substances "such elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which,
when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public health or
welfare of the environment." In addition, courts have contributed additional interpretations
of the term. For example, in United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1340 (E.D. Pa.
1983), the court ruled that a waste is hazardous if it contains any quantity of substances
designated as hazardous or toxic under the statutes specified in the definition of "hazardous
substance."
16 "Environment" generally includes navigable waters and "any other surface water,
ground water, drinking water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or
ambient air." Id. § 9601(8).
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ardous materials, and implementation of an appropriate permanent
remedial action plan. 17 Any remedial action must be both "cost-effec-
tive"" and, to the greatest extent practicable, consistent with the Na-
tional Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan" (the
"National Contingency Plan" or "NCP").' Moreover, implementation of
permanent remedial action generally requires a cooperative agreement
with the state in which the site is located.2 1 This agreement ought to pro-
vide, inter alia, that the state will pay ten percent of the costs of response
action.
2 2
Section 105 of the Act2 s requires the President to revise and republish
a National Contingency Plan to reflect and effectuate the responsibilities
and powers created by CERCLA.2 4 The Plan must establish procedures
and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, includ-
ing assurances that "remedial action measures are cost-effective. '2 Re-
sponse and remedial actions regarding the release of hazardous sub-
stances must be compatible with the provisions of the Plan "to the
greatest extent possible.
20
Section 107 2 authorizes the government to maintain an action in fed-
eral court to recover monies expended from the Superfund for response
and remedial actions taken pursuant to section 104.28 The parties liable
17 See supra note 13 and infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
-8 42 U.S.C. § 9605(7)(Supp. V 1981); see infra 92-98 and accompanying text.
" 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4)(Supp. V 1981).
20 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1983); see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
11 See in/ra note 88.
"2 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(Supp. V 1981). If the site at which response occurs was owned
at the time of any disposal of hazardous substances by the state or any political subdivision,
the state is required to provide 50% of the response costs. Id.
I d. § 9605.
The National Contingency Plan was promulgated on July 16, 1982 and is codified at
40 C.F-R. § 300 (1983). It replaced an earlier plan promulgated under § 311(c) of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1982). 40 C.F.R. § 300.1-.2 (1983).
20 42 U.S.C. § 9605(7) (Supp. V 1981).
26 Id. § 9605.
'7 Id. § 9607.
28 Actual expenditures of money from the Superfund is governed by § 111 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. V 1981). That section authorizes payment for governmental response
costs incurred under § 104 as well as payment of "any claim for necessary response costs
incurred by any other person as a result of carrying out the national contingency plan." Id.
§ 9611(a)(1) and (2). Liability under the Act includes, however, "all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan" and "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan." Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B). The
Act also imposes liability for any damages caused to natural resources. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
Before payment from the Superfund can occur, there must be compliance with the claims
procedure outlined in § 112 of CERCLA. Id. § 9612. According to that section, claims
which may be asserted against the Superfund must first be presented to persons who may
be liable under § 107. If the claim remains unsatisfied, the claimant may either file suit
1984-85]
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in such an action29 may include the present and certain past owners and
operators of a site, transporters of hazardous substances, and persons who
arranged for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances
which they owned or possessed"0 at a site from which there has been a
release of hazardous substance.3 " Section 107(b) delineates a limited num-
ber of statutory defenses.3 2 The statute does not establish a dollar limit
for the amount of response costs for which a responsible party can be
held liable.33
In addition to cost recovery actions under section 107, a federal action
also may be brought by the government under section 106. "If there is an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare
or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a haz-
ardous substance from a facility," ' the court is empowered "to grant
such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may re-
quire. '3 5 However, the Act is silent as to the parties from whom such
relief may be obtained."
III. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA
There are 546 sites on the National Priority List (NPL) that is promul-
gated as part of the National Contingency Plan.3 7 Typically, the sites ap-
against the potentially responsible party or present the claim for payment from the
Superfund. Id. Once presented to the Superfund, the claim is processed in accordance with
the procedures established under § 112. If the claim is then paid, the government acquires
by subrogation the rights of the claimant to recover the amount of the claim "from the
person responsible or liable for such release." Id. § 9612(c)(1).
21 The extent of liability generally consists of the cost of response and remedial action.
See supra note 28.
" Generally, this particular description of potentially responsible parties includes the
generators of hazardous substances. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 846-47 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562
F. Supp. 1300, 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
Si 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981).
32 Id. § 9607(b); see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1981). However, there is a limit upon re-
sponse cost liability for releases from vessels and an absolute limit of $50 million upon lia-
bility for damages to natural resources. Id. § 9607(c)(1)(A)-(C). Limits upon liability are
waived if the release was the result of willful misconduct or negligence, or if the primary
cause of the release was the result of a knowing violation of an applicable standard or regu-
lation. Id. § 9607(c)(2). Finally, punitive treble damages may be recovered if any liable
party fails without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial action upon an
order issued by the President pursuant to §§ 104 or 106 of the Act. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
3' Id. Section 106 also authorizes the Administrator of the EPA, as the designee of the
President, to take other action including "issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect
public health and welfare and the environment." Id. See infra note 113.
31 See infra notes 120-140 and accompanying text.
"1 The NCP is to include criteria for determining priorities among releases "based upon
relative risk or danger to public health or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C.
[Vol. 33:1
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pearing on the NPL are hazardous waste dumps, often abandoned after
years of indiscriminate use. Frequently, the hazardous wastes were trans-
ported to the sites by firms hired to dispose of chemical wastes generated
by various industrial and manufacturing operations.
After identifying a site for which response action may be necessary, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) generally initiates an investiga-
tion to identify the parties potentially responsible.38 Because current and
former owners of abandoned sites, as well as the disposal firms, are often
without significant assets, it is not unusual for the EPA to focus its en-
forcement efforts upon the industrial and manufacturing operations that
generate the waste.39 The EPA generally informs the generators of their
potential liability and invites them to participate in both the formation
and implementation of a remedial action plan. 40 If the potentially respon-
sible party refuses to cooperate with the government at this stage,4 the
EPA will either seek injunctive relief under section 106,11 or proceed with
its own remedial action program at the site and seek reimbursement in a
subsequent section 107 action.43
§ 9605(8)(A) (Supp. V 1981). In light of these criteria, the plan lists the priorities among
the known or threatened releases. Id. § 9605(8)(B). In order to list releases by priority, the
Plan utilizes the Hazard Ranking System (HRS), a uniform method used to identify those
releases of hazardous substances that pose the greatest hazard to humans or the environ-
ment. 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. A (1983). The HRS measures the potential for harm to humans
or the environment from: (a) migration of a hazardous substance away from a facility by
ground water, surface water or air; (b) substances that can explode or cause fires; and
(c) direct contact with hazardous substances at the facility itself. Id. § 1.0. States seeking
to include a particular release site on the NPL must use the HRS because the EPA will
review the state submissions to ensure compliance. If the state submission complies with the
HRS, the EPA will add the release as welU as any additional priority releases known to it to
the NPL. 40 C.F.R. § 300.66(e) (1983). The NPL will be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. B.
48 Fed. Reg. 40,670 (1983).
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.33(b)(2) (1983).
See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
40 Guidelines for Using the Imminent Hazard, Enforcement and Emergency Response
Authorities of Superfund and Other Statutes, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664, 20,666 (1982). Under
§ 104, response action cannot be taken if it is determined that such action "will be done
properly by the owner or operator of the vessel or facility from which the release or threat of
release emanates, or by any other responsible party". 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp.
V 1981). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.61(b), 300.64(c)(5) (1983). The NCP directs those overseeing
government action to conserve Superfund money by encouraging private party cleanup. 40
C.F.R. § 300.61(c)(2) (1983). It also instructs the agency leading the action to base assess-
ments of its need upon, inter alia, the existence of parties ready, willing and able to under-
take a proper response. Id. § 300.64(a)(3).
" For a discussion of pre-enforcement involvement by potentially responsible parties in
developing and implementing remedial actions plans, see [generally this issue].
"' See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. IP-83-9-C (S.D. Ind., June
29, 1983).
41 See cases cited supra note 39.
1984-85]
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A. Liability Under Section 107
Thus far, recovery by the EPA of its response costs under section 107
has been erratic due to slow investigation of hazardous waste sites and
subsequent development and implementation of appropriate remedial ac-
tion plans.44 While most complaints filed by the government under CER-
CLA include a section 107 claim, few cases involve a situation where the
EPA has completed all response actions and is seeking recovery for its
total costs. Consequently, initial court decisions interpreting the section
have focused on identifying the level of conduct necessary to create liabil-
ity for response costs and have left the complicated questions relating to
the extent of such liability for future resolution.
1. Persons Liable
Liability under section 107 is triggered by a release, or a threatened
release, of a hazardous substance from a facility that causes the govern-
ment to incur response costs." Parties subject to liability under this sec-
tion include four classes of individuals having some relationship to the
facility and/or the hazardous substances present there." Although the
statutory language is somewhat diffuse, there is little doubt that Congress
intended to impose liability for appropriate response costs upon present
and certain former owners of the facility, generators of the hazardous
substances found at the facility, and transporters of the hazardous sub-
stances.' 7 While questions as to whether particular defendants actually
44 In an attempt to overcome the slow pace in cleaning up known hazardous waste sites,
the CERCLA reauthorization bill, introduced by Representative James J. Florio, includes a
mandatory cleanup schedule. It calls for the completion of remedial action of all current
sites on the NPL within five years of enactment of the bill. H.R. 4813, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 101 (1984).
" In United States v. Hardage, No. CIV-80-1031-W, slip op. at 19-21 (W.D. Okla. Dec.
13, 1982), the court ruled that a clear reading of § 104(a) of CERCLA indicates that the
government can respond, and liability arises, whenever there is a release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance even though the situation does not constitute an "imminent
and substantial endangerment." However, if the released substance does not constitute a
hazardous substance as defined by CERCLA, there must be an imminent and substantial
endangerment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
6 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981). By definition, the term "person" as used in the Act
refers to individuals, corporations, and other business organizations, as well as governmental
entities. Id. § 9601(21).
' In defining the classes, section 107(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
[Vol. 33:1
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fall within one of the four classes have arisen,4" the classes as such have
not been narrowed.4 9 The government has instead successfully main-
tained a section 107 action against the corporate officers of an off-site
generator,60 has overcome the argument that only generators who actually
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substance, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release.
4s For example, in United States v. Price, 577 Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983), the generator
alleged in a motion for summary judgement that it was not liable because the government
had failed to implicate it to the site. Although the court noted that it was unclear whether
loading tickets connecting the generator to the site would be admissible and that testimony
of the purported transporter of the generator's waste "was far from dispositive," it denied
the motion. Id. at 1116 n.13, 1117. See also United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (affidavit of disposal company president was "adequate to survive defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment; however, because [the president's] credibility as a
convicted felon and a defendant in this case, is seriously contested, his affidavit does not
suffice to establish the fact of dumping by the defendants.").
At least one court has articulated the type of evidence sufficient to establish a connection
between the generator and a hazardous waste site. Noting the costs that may be associated
with attempting to identify waste types at a particular site through analytical means, the
court in United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., No. 80-1274-6 (D.S.C.
Feb 23, 1984), apparently would relieve a § 107 plaintiff from presenting scientific proof
that a defendant's wastes were connected to the site. Instead, "less resource exhaustive
means of showing that a generator's waste or similar wastes are at a site, such as by identifi-
cation of a generator's drum at the site during cleanup or by way of documentary or circum-
stantial proof that the wastes were hauled to the site absent proof that they were subse-
quently taken away, should also be sufficient to satisfy this element of proof." Id., slip op. at
11 n.6.
" One governmental entity has successfully argued against inclusion among the classes
of liable parties under CERCLA. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in United States v.
Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983), asserted that even though it owned and
operated a hazardous waste site, it could not be included as a third-party defendant under
§ 107. The court held that the state was not liable because the eleventh amendment estab-
lished state immunity which Congress did not intend to abrogate when it passed CERCLA.
Id. at 952-53. A past owner of a site has also been excluded from those liable under CER-
CLA because no disposal of wastes occurred during the period of its ownership. Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20376,
20378 (C.D. Cal. March 5, 1984).
10 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D.
Mo. 1984). In Northeastern Pharmaceutical, the court held two corporate officers of a waste
generator personally liable under § 107. However, at least part of the court's reasoning is
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select and designate a particular disposal site may be held liable under
this section"' and has been allowed to proceed against a generator who
arguably based on misreadings of CERCLA, which is understandable given the diffuse lan-
guage of § 107. In imposing liability upon one Lee, vice president and supervisor of the
generator's plant, the court cited his involvement in arranging for the disposal of the haz-
ardous substance at a local farm as a basis for liability under § 107(a)(3). The court ob-
served that the section clearly states that the person arranging for the disposal is not re-
quired to actually own or possess the hazardous waste or the facility from which it is moved
for disposition." Id. 847. In reaching this conclusion, the court read the phrase "by any
other party or entity" as a modifier of the phrase "hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed." Disregarding its syntactical difficulties, the court's reading precludes any need
whatsoever for the statute to specify particular ownership. A more logical interpretation of
the provision would associate "by any other party or entity" with the act of disposal or
treatment.
The court also imposed liability upon Lee, as well as Michaels, president of the corporate-
generator, because their positions made them owners and operators of Northeastern Phar-
maceutical's plant. As a result, the court held both individuals liable under § 107(a)(1). Id.
at 848-49. However, that provision, when read in its entirety, imposes liability upon the
owner or operator of the facility from which the release occurs, not the facility at which the
hazardous substance was generated.
The court in United States v. Wade 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983), took a more
reasoned approach to the question of individual liability of a corporate officer. Relying on
common law theory, the court ruled that "a corporate officer may be held liable if he per-
sonally participates in the wrongful, injury-producing act." Id. at 1341. However, neither
mere placement of drums at the site nor mere negotiation of a waste disposal agreement
constituted acts sufficient to establish individual liability. Id. at 1341- 42.
5' See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
There has been some discussion about whether a party potentially liable under § 107 may
also recover its response costs under the same section. In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the city sought to recover its costs for clean-
ing up a city-owned site at which hazardous waste had been disposed without its knowledge
or permission. The generator-defendants sought to dismiss the city's claim under § 107 be-
cause, as the owner of the facility, the city was also potentially liable for response costs. Id.
at 1141. In the opinion of the generator-defendants, to allow one responsible party to re-
cover its response costs from another responsible party would have created inconsistencies
in the claims provision of CERCLA. Id. The main inconsistency cited by the defendants
arises from the government's acquired subrogation rights whenever it paid a claim from the
Superfund. See supra note 28. Thus, the defendants raised the spectre of a "merry go round
of litigation with the government suing a responsible person which in turn could sue other
responsible persons which in turn could claim against the fund and so forth." Id.
The court permitted the city's claim under the Act. It rejected defendants' fears as hypo-
thetical because no other entity had yet incurred response costs which would support an
action against the city. Id. at 1143. Because the city did not operate the site as a hazardous
waste facility or give its permission for the placement of the hazardous substances on its
property, the court did not prevent the city from proceeding under § 107. To do so would
frustrate a primary purpose of CERCLA by failing to place the ultimate cost upon those
primarily responsible for creating the hazard. Id. at 1142-43.
The district court later certified for appeal its ruling in this regard pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1982). City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 14 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 20007 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1983).
A seemingly contradictory result was suggested in D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F.
Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983). In D'Imperio, the current owners of a hazardous waste site sought
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actually sold its waste material to the disposer."
With the possible exception of corporate officers,"5 there does not seem
to exist much disagreement over who is included within the terms of sec-
tion 107. Rather, attention has focused on the standard of liability to be
applied to the persons who are, in fact, included.
2. Standards of Liability
Illustrative of the compromise leading to the passage of CERCLA was
the deletion from section 107 of any reference to a standard of liability to
be imposed in actions against potentially responsible parties. 4 Rather
than including language which specifically establishes a negligence or
strict liability standard, 6 the definitional section of CERCLA merely
states that "liable" or "liability" as used in the Act "shall be construed to
be the standard of liability which obtains under section 311 of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act" ("Clean Water Act" or "CWA").
The policy decisions that Congress hoped to avoid by adopting this
compromise language have merely been deferred to the courts where the
judicial decision-making process focuses upon both the legislative history
of the Act and the policy arguments made in Congress. Armed with the
precedent of CWA section 311, which holds owners and operators of ves-
sels and facilities strictly liable for the cleanup of spills into navigable
a declaratory judgment that they could not be held liable for costs of cleaning up the site
and that any money they might contribute to future clean up efforts would be reimbursable
under § 107. The court stated that the case was premature because the government had not
yet initiated an action against the owners who, in turn, had not yet spent any money to
clean up the site. Id. at 251-253. Accord Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST. 20376, 20380-81 (C.D. Cal. March 5, 1984). Because the
plaintiffs were unable to establish their lack of liability for response costs, they were ineligi-
ble for reimbursement. In order to recover these costs, a party must prove that he himself is
not liable for such costs. Id. at 253.
Section 107 does not explicitly establish the prerequisite which the D'Imperio court would
impose upon parties seeking recovery of response costs. Indeed, the court did not explain its
holding that "[iln order to seek recovery under [§ 107], it is necessary for the plaintiff to
prove that he himself is not liable for these costs." Id. One may infer that the court may
have been persuaded by the potential difficulties posited by the defendants in Stepan
Chemical.
6 United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. IIl. 1984).
6' See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
6' In reporting the final Senate amendments to CERCLA to the House of Representa-
tives, Rep. James Florio noted: "The liability provisions of this bill do not refer to the terms
strict, joint and several liability, terms which were contained in the version of H.R. 7020
passed earlier by this body." 126 CONG. REc. H11787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)(statement of
Rep. Florio).
'1 See, e.g., S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Seass. § 4(a) (1979).
56 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. V 1981). Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
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waters,5 7 the government has successfully argued for a standard of strict
liability in section 107 cost recovery actions. Indeed, courts which have
directly ruled on the question often have resolved the issue by reference
to the cases decided under CWA section 311.58
The section 311 strict liability standard does not necessarily extend to
section 107 cost recovery actions, or at least those against off-site genera-
tors. The standard of liability "which obtains under [CWA section 311]"
applies only to present owners and operators of vessels and facilities" and
thus on its face does not impose liability upon as broad a class of persons
as that encompassed by CERCLA section 107. In addition, factors which
favor the imposition of a strict liability standard upon the owners and
operators of a facility at the time a release occurs-their direct control
over and responsibility for operating practices of the facility-arguably
do not apply to persons such as off-site generators who have effectively
relinquished control of the wastes to presumably responsible third
parties.10
The unquestioning adoption of the strict liability standard for off-site
generators has been accompanied by an apparent weakening of the tradi-
tional standards of causation. In United States v. Wade,"' the court held
that the government need not establish a causal relationship between the
waste associated with a particular party and the incurrence of cleanup
costs resulting from an actual or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance. While imposing liability under section 107 upon an off-site gener-
ator of wastes, the court stated that "the only required nexus between the
11 See United States v. MNV Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
U.S. __ , 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983); United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787
(5th Cir. 1980); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978); Burgess v. MN Tamano, 564
F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977).
" Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa 1982). In
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-1114 (D.N.J. 1983), the court held that
§ 107 imposes a standard of strict liability without referring to CWA § 311 or the precedent
thereunder, but instead relied upon an examination of the legislative history and policy
arguments. See also United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., No. 80-
1274-6, slip op. at 7 n.2 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984) (referring to standard of liability under § 107
as strict liability).
50 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982).
00 But see United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983), where the court
stated:
The fulfillment of these Congressional goals [cost spreading and assurance that
responsible parties bear the cost of cleanup] is more likely to be effectuated if the
defendants who allegedly contributed to the environmental mess are now held to a
very stringent standard of liability. Though strict liability may impose harsh re-
sults on certain defendants, it is the most equitable solution in view of the alter-
native-forcing those who bear no responsibility for causing the damage, the tax-
payers, to shoulder the full cost of the clean up.
00 Id. (footnote omitted). 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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defendant and the site is that the defendant has dumped his waste there
and that the hazardous substances found in the defendant's waste are
also found at the site."11 2 The court found that requiring the government
to "fingerprint" a released waste as that of a particular generator would
"eviscerate the statute" inasmuch as the government admitted that it was
technically incapable of identifying with any certainty the generator of
specific waste." Based upon an examination of the statutory language64
and legislative history," the court also concluded that the traditional tort
concept of proximate causation was not a necessary element of the strict
liability standard applicable under section 107."'
3. Defenses to Liability and Elements of Recovery
Section 107 (b) delineates three affirmative defenses available to a
party who is otherwise liable for response costs. In general, the party can
defend on the ground that the release or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance and the resulting damages were caused solely by an act of
62 Id. at 1333. This holding was expressly adopted in United States v. South Carolina
Recycling and Disposal, Inc., No. 80-1274-6, slip op. at 10 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984). That court,
without referring to any particular statutory provisions or citing any specific legislative his-
tory, remarked that CERCLA "takes into account the synergistic potential of improperly
managed hazardous substances and essentially presumes a contributory 'casual' relationship
between each of the hazardous substances disposed of at a site and the hazardous conditions
existing at the site." Id., slip op. at 10 n.5.
" United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332. The court did not address the issue of
causation where the defendant can establish that its wastes were not responsible for a re-
lease requiring Superfund expenditures or the government develops the capability to finger-
print wastes. The factual issues involved in such circumstances are very similar to those
which may arise when defendants in a multi-generator situation try to defeat the imposition
of joint and several liability. See generally United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802, 810-811 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (respecting defendants', generators' and transporters' allega-
tions that they could not be found jointly and severally liable under CERCLA).
64 577 F. Supp. at 1332-33. The court noted in passing "the lack of precision with which
the statute was drafted." Id. at 1332.
" The Wade court felt it significant that, during consideration of Superfund legislation,
Congress had dropped from the legislation language which imposed liability on "any person
who caused or contributed to the release." Id. at 1333 (quoting H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 3071(a)(1), 126 CONG. Rsc. H9459 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980)). See also United States
v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 n.11 ("Congress eliminated any language [in § 107] requir-
ing plaintiff to prove proximate cause.").
66 577 F. Supp. at 1333-34. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.
1978) (causation is a necessary element in a case seeking recovery of cleanup costs under
§ 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); cf. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (court notes the "persuasive argument"
that "where an entity falls within the technical description of a responsible party but has
little or no connection with the creation of the hazardous condition, the imposition of CER-
CLA liability may be unwarranted."). Contra Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.
1300, 1306 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (describing causation as "an element of the [§ 107] cause of
action").
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God, an act of war, or an act of an unrelated third party.6 7 Only the act of
an unrelated third party, which is similar to the traditional defense of
intervening cause, is likely to have any general application. 8
In light of these limited and specific affirmative defenses, potentially
responsible parties have argued that the government's failure to comply
with the technical response and recovery provisions of CERCLA pre-
cludes the imposition of liability. To date, these arguments have been
generally unsuccessful.6 9
The court in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp."' ruled that
the government's failure to enter into a cooperative agreement with the
state in accordance with section 104(c)(3) of CERCLA7" did not bar an
action under section 107 for recovery of response costs.72 Relying on the
"subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b)" clause of section
107(a), the court concluded that "Congress did not intend that the courts
engage in the complex inquiry and statutory tracing of the various sec-
Section 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(Supp. V 1981), states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person oth-
erwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the re-
lease or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by -
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third person other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contrac-
tual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where
the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for
carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such haz-
ardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
68 This defense is somewhat narrower than that available under § 311(f) of the CWA,
which excuses an owner or operator from liability if the discharge was caused by, inter alia,
"an act or omission of a third party without regard to whether any such act or omission was
or was not negligent." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982). At least one court has cited the inclusion
of the "due care" defense under § 107(b)(3) as grounds for applying a strict liability stan-
dard under § 107. See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 114 (D.N.J. 1983).
9 See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
70 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
11 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see infra note 88 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing relationship between the requirements of § 104(c)(3) and § 107 liability).
" The court held: "Whether there should be a cooperative agreement between the Presi-
dent and Minnesota as provided by section 104(c)(3) is not material in determining Reilly
Tar's potential liability under section 107(a)." 546 F. Supp. at 1118. The court had earlier
ruled similarly that the government's recovery action was not barred by the lack of a revised
national contingency plan at the time the government initiated response activities. Id. at
1115-16.
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tions" of CERCLA.13 Thus "liability under section 107(a) is independent
of the authorized uses of the Fund under section 111 and of the coopera-
tive agreement called for by section 104(c)(3). ' '74 Instead, "liability for the
specified response costs under section 107(a) is absolute. 7 5
Other courts have wrestled with the relationship between liability
under section 107 and the detailed response provisions of CERCLA, but
the basic issue of what elements are required for the government's case
for recovery of response costs is far from settled. In United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.,7 6 the court found that
compliance with section 104 was not essential to an action by the govern-
ment under section 107.71 The court also held that the government did
not have the burden of proving as a part of its prima facie case that its
response actions were consistent with the NCP. Instead the double nega-
tive, "not inconsistent" contained in section 107(a), placed that burden
on the defendants.7 8 Similarly, the court in Ohio ex rel. Brown v. George-
off9 held that the government need not enter into a cooperative agree-
ment with the state before it would be entitled to recovery under section
107 because sections 107 and 104 are not coterminous. Thus, "a [section
107] action might be brought where Superfund response authority does
not exist under [section 1041. ' '80 However, in J. V. Peters & Co. v. Ruckel-
shaus,8' the court found a direct relationship between the two sections. It
ruled that upon a showing that the EPA did not act in accordance with
section 104(a), as well as the National Contingency Plan, a party would
not be held liable under section 107 for the costs of the government's
response actions.82
" Id. at 1118.
14 Id.
" Id. (emphasis added). This statement merely begs the question of the relationship
between § 107 and other provisions of CERCLA. The court failed to attribute any meaning
whatsoever to the phrase "not inconsistent with the national contingency plan" which is one
of the specifications of § 107.
579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
Id. at 850.
78 Id. The court contrasted this language with the language of § 107(a)(4)(B) which
states that responsible parties are liable for "any other costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B)). Thus, it concluded that a different standard applied to private parties
who "must affirmatively show that their actions were consistent." Id. In order to demon-
strate such consistency and have a valid claim for response costs assertable against the
Superfund under § 111(a)(2), a nongovernmental party must have received approval before
taking any specific response action. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981); 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.25(d) (1983).
78 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
80 Id.
81 No. C 83-4436 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 1984) (available May 27, 1984, on WESTLAw, Dis-
trict Courts database).
8 Id., slip op. at 9. In J.V. Peters, the current and former owners of a hazardous waste
1984-851
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Reilly Tar, Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Georgeoff may reflect an
unduly narrow reading of the statute. The requirement of section
104(c)(3) that the government enter into a cooperative agreement with
the state where the release took place is incorporated into the National
Contingency Plan.8 3 Since section 107(a)(4)(B) imposes liability only for
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the government "not in-
consistent with the national contingency plan," the absence of a state co-
operative agreement would presumably be inconsistent with the Plan and
would bar an action under section 107.
The Northeastern Pharmaceutical court's reliance on the particular
choice of words in section 107 is perilous in light of the last-minute com-
promises that resulted in the fractured language of the statute., Refer-
ences to government response activity in terms of the National Contin-
gency Plan contain varying terminology throughout the statute. In
response to the actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances, the
government is authorized only "to act, consistent with the national con-
tingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for
remedial action relating to such hazardous substance." 853 Had Congress
intended defendants in a section 107 action to prove the government's
noncompliance with the NCP as an affirmative defense, presumably it
would have stated its intent with at least a minimal degree of clarity."
It is difficult to reconcile the failure of these courts to recognize the
interrelationship of the Act's statutory provisions with the language of
section 107 or with the overall framework of CERCLA. However poorly
drafted, CERCLA does attempt to implement a comprehensive and inter-
related program in which enforcement actions play a major role., Section
site sought to prevent the EPA from undertaking response action at the site. Citing the
complaint's "merely conclusory allegations," the court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim. Id., slip op at 8. Such a claim would be proper "if the owner or operator of a
waste facility averred that the EPA had absolutely no rational basis for undertaking a re-
sponse action and that no preliminary assessment [of the threat to the environment present
at the site] had been made." Id., slip op. at 7.
, 40 C.F.R. § 300.62(c)(1) (1983).
" See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
05 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). See also id. § 9604(c)(4)
("The President shall select appropriate remedial actions determined to be necessary to
carry out this section which are to the extent practicable in accordance with the national
contingency plan .... "); id. § 9605 ("Following publication of the revised national contin-
gency plan, the response to and actions to minimize damage from hazardous substances
releases shall, to the greatest extent possible, be in accordance with the provisions of the
plan.").
,0 That Congress was capable of achieving such clarity is evident from § 111(h)(2) where
Congress states that any government assessment of damages to natural resources "shall have
the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of any claimant." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611(h)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
87 Both §§ 104 and 112 rely upon concepts embodied in § 107. For example, pursuant to
§ 104, the government may undertake response actions unless it determines that a "respon-
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104, in conjunction with the National Contingency Plan, establishes an
orderly process for responding to actual or potential releases from hazard-
ous waste sites. Limitations on this process consist of the following re-
quirements: (1) that permanent remedial action be determined only after
consultation with affected states;"a (2) that implementation of permanent
remedial action occur only after the federal and state governments have
entered into a state cooperative agreement;a9 (3) that there be a detailed
development and analysis of remedial alternatives;90 and (4) that re-
sponse actions be cost-effective." Failure to effectuate these limitations
within the context of section 107 enforcement actions removes a major
incentive for the government to comply with the congressionally ordered
procedure.9 2
4. Recovery of Particular Response Costs
A major limitation on governmental response actions under the Na-
tional Contingency Plan is the requirement that they be cost-effective.93
Thus, even though a responsible party may be liable under section 107 for
government response costs for actions consistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan,9 4 this liability should cover only those response activities
which are cost-effective. The NCP defines the "cost-effective" remedial
alternative as "the lowest cost alternative that is technologically feasible
and reliable and which effectively mitigates and minimizes damage to and
provides adequate protection of public health, welfare, or the environ-
sible party" will initiate proper removal and remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp.
V 1981). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.61(b), .64(c)(5) (1983). A "responsible party" undoubtedly is
a party as described in § 107. Similarly, § 112 states that a claim for reimbursement from
the Superfund for response costs pursuant to § 111 must in the first instance be presented
to any person "who may be liable under § 107." 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (Supp. V 1981). If the
claim remains unsatisfied, the claimant may then institute a lawsuit against such person. Id.
88 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981); 40 C.F.R. § 300.62(f) (1983).
8 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 40 C.F.R. § 300.62(c)(1) (1983). The coopera-
tive agreement must contain certain provisions: (1) that the state will assure all future
maintenance of the removal and remedial actions; (2) that the state will assure the availabil-
ity of a hazardous waste disposal facility for any necessary off-site treatment, storage, or
disposal; and (3) that the state will pay 10% of the costs of remedial action (50% if hazard-
ous waste site is government owned). 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
90 40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (1983).
81 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(j) (1983). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(7) (Supp. V 1981) (NCP to include "means of assuring that remedial action mea-
sures are cost-effective over the period of potential exposure to the hazardous substances or
contaminated materials.")
9 Ensuring compliance with the provisions of CERCLA, including its governmental re-
sponse procedure requirements, will not in any way remove the ultimate liability from those
identified by Congress as responsible parties.
93 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(c)(4), 9605(7) (Supp. V 1981); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(0) (1983).
" See supra notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
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ment .... "5 Identification of the cost-effective remedy is made after
the development,9" screening,97 and detailed analysis 8 of possible alterna-
tives. To date, the courts have not determined whether remedies either
implemented or sought by the government are cost-effective. Further,
there are no indications of how rigorous the courts' attention will be to
the detailed provisions of the National Contingency Plan on remedial
alternatives.99
Those preliminary questions receiving some degree of attention from
the courts relate to the appropriate time for bringing a cost-recovery ac-
tion. In United States v. Wade,"00 the court addressed the question of
whether a cost-recovery action was premature when the government had
not yet incurred costs recoverable under section 107. The court held that
the government could institute an action against a potentially responsible
" 40 C.F.R. § 300.686) (1983). In the preamble to the NCP, the EPA explained in more
detail the importance of cost-effectiveness in selecting a remedy. According to the EPA,
"Although cost does play an important role in selection of remedies, it does not take prece-
dence over protection of public health, welfare and the environment." 47 Fed Reg. 31,185
(1982). The Agency specifically pointed out that the procedure for assessing alternative rem-
edies outlined in the NCP "explicitly requires remedies that provide the requisite protection
of public health while still meeting statutory requirements for analysis of costs and cost-
effectiveness. Cost alone may not control these decisions." Id.
11 Under 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(g) (1983), the development of remedial alternatives ought to
take place in conjunction with a remedial investigation in order to determine whether source
control or off-site remedial actions are appropriate. It also should include consideration of
numerous factors relating to the nature of the hazardous substances involved and to the
physical conditions and environs of the site. See id. § 300.68(e)-(f). The NCP specifically
permits consideration of a no-action alternative "when response action may cause a greater
environmental or health danger than no action." Id. § 300.68(g).
91 Initial screening of remedial alternatives involves consideration of three general crite-
ria: cost, effects of the alternative, and acceptable engineering practices. 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.68(h) (1983) The NCP excludes alternatives from further consideration if: (1) the cost
of an alternative far exceeds the cost of other alternatives without providing substantially
greater benefits to public health or the environment; (2) an alternative has significant ad-
verse effects; or (3) an alternative is not feasible or reliable given the location and conditions
of the release of the hazardous substance. Id.
11 Remedial alternatives remaining after the initial screening are to be subjected to a
detailed analysis of the following factors: (1) specification of the alternative emphasizing
established technology; (2) cost estimation; (3) constructability; (4) effectiveness in mitigat-
ing and minimizing damage from the release; and (5) methods for and costs of mitigating
any adverse environmental impacts. Id. § 300.68(i). The NCP does not establish priorities
or relative degrees of importance among these factors.
91 The decision in Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 851
(W.D. Mo. 1984), states that "a review of the remedial and removal actions taken by the
government leads this Court to conclude that such actions were consistent with the national
contingency plan." Although the court did not so state, this review presumably included
consideration of the cost-effectiveness of the actions. Cf. United States v. A. & F Materials
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1259 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (conclusory allegations that costs incurred to
date by the government are consistent with the NCP sufficient to withstand motion to
dismiss).
00 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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party after emergency measures had been undertaken but before the
cleanup had been completed.' Yet, in United States v. Price,02 the
court concluded that the government must first begin the cleanup and
incur some expense before it can initiate an action. 03
Finally, in Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff,10 the defendants argued
that settlement funds received from other generators exceeded response
costs incurred by the government, thus denying any basis for a cost-re-
covery action. The court, however, rejected this argument and concluded
that "the previously committed funds should not be applied to reimburse
Ohio's previously incurred response costs and that Ohio has sufficiently
pled a claim for previously incurred response costs pursuant to section
9607 (a)(4)(A)."'' 0 5
These rulings suggest a larger issue: can the government seek recovery
of future costs from a potentially responsible party? In United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 06 the government
sought a declaratory judgment for future response costs. The court held
that, while it could not award costs until they were incurred, liability for
future costs could be imposed upon the defendants. 10' In contrast, the
Price court suggested that costs incurred subsequent to the filing of the
complaint but before the conclusion of litigation did not constitute "costs
incurred" under section 107.105
The time at which the government chooses to seek recovery of its re-
sponse costs may affect a court's ability to determine whether particular
response actions were cost-effective, and thus recoverable, under CER-
CLA. Theoretically, a court cannot find that a particular expenditure is
cost-effective unless the expenditure is evaluated in the context of an
overall remedial action plan, developed in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan. It therefore follows that the government should not be
'o Id. at 1335. Accord United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal Inc., No.
80-1274-6 slip op. at 25 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984)(dictum); United States v. A & F Materials
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1259 (S.D. Ill. 1984). The Wade court resolved additional time-
related issues in ruling that while the government can not recover response costs incurred
prior to the enactment of CERCLA, it may recover costs pre-dating promulgation of the
NCP. United States v. Wade, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20437 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22,
1984).
102 577 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1983).
"' Id. at 110. The Price court ruled that a general allegation that "the United States has
incurred and will continue to incur response costs" was not sufficient to establish a cause of
action under section 107. Id. at 110 n.5 (quoting government's complaint). The court thus
would require some specification of the costs.
l 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
"' Id. at 1316. The state had argued that the settlement funds were to be applied to
future response costs. Id. at 1315.
'" 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
..7 Id. at 852-53. Accord Ohio ex. rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1316 (N.D.
Ohio 1983).
... United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 n.5 (D.N.J. 1983).
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able to recover response costs under section 107 without first outlining its
overall remedial action plan and without demonstrating the necessity of
the particular component for which it seeks recovery.109
B. Actions For Injunctive Relief Under Section 106
As originally formulated, the Superfund made $1.6 billion available for
the government to clean-up abandoned hazardous waste sites."' Faced
with a current total of 546 sites appearing on the National Priority List"'
and response costs averaging in the millions of dollars per site, the gov-
ernment is naturally concerned about the adequacy of the Superfund.
Consequently, in addition to seeking recovery of its response costs under
section 107, the government also seeks injunctive relief under section 106
of CERCLA.' Section 106(a) specifically permits an action to be brought
in federal court for such injunctive relief "as may be necessary to abate"
an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or wel-
fare of the environment.""' The court may grant "such relief as the pub-
"" Admittedly, there may be some allowable distinction in this regard between costs asso-
ciated with immediate removal activity and those incurred as part of an overall remedial
action plan.
'0 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. V 1981). See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1330 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
1 48 Fed. Reg. 40, 674 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300).
112 The government clearly believes that the enforcement authorities created under
§§ 106 and 107 are complementary and interchangeable. See generally Guidelines for Using
the Imminent Hazard, Enforcement and Emergency Response Authorities of Superfund and
Other Statues, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664 (1982) (describing relationship between government re-
sponse activities and various enforcement mechanisms).
However, judicial response to that view has varied. In United States v. Wade, 546 F.
Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983), the court appar-
ently rejected the government's position by refusing to grant relief under § 106 against non-
negligent off-site generators. The court noted that relief against such parties would be
proper under § 107 and was "astonished" at the government's choice to ignore that provi-
sion. 546 F. Supp. at 787. In United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 20385, 20387 (C.D. Cal. April 5, 1984), the court found "no compelling parallelism"
between §§ 106 and 107 and concluded that "it is eminently reasonable to assign to section
106 and 107 distinct functions in CERCLA." Other courts have allowed the government
more latitude in selecting enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103, 1112 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Congress envisioned possible problems with the govern-
ment funding numerous clean ups and drafted § 106(a) as a viable alternative or concurrent
means of achieving the same goal.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 110, 1114 (D. Minn. 1982) ("While section 106(a) should not
become a substitute for other reasonably available response mechanisms, the availability of
other response authorities for dealing with chronic and recurring pollution problems does
not preclude the simultaneous invocation of the imminent hazard provision of section
106.").
8 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). An action under this section can be maintained
only by the government because it does not create an implied private cause of action. Cadil-
lac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 ENv'L. L. REP. (EsvrL. L. INST.) 20376,
20380 (C.D. Cal. March 5, 1984).
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lic interest and the equities of the case may require.""' However, this
section, like section 107, leaves the burden of developing meaningful stan-
dards of liability to the courts. Furthermore, it provides significantly less
guidance in this regard than section 107."' Not surprisingly, cases arising
under section 106 have focused upon whether and under what circum-
stances subsection (a) imposes liability for remedial measures upon own-
ers and operators of hazardous waste sites as well as off-site generators of
wastes. Those issues, and the meaning of terms such as "imminent and
substantial endangerment""' 6 will undoubtedly provide the gist for fur-
ther controversy, particularly if the EPA perceives a section 106 action as
interchangeable with the remedies available under sections 104 and
107.117
Prior to the enactment of CERCLA, section 7003 of the Resource Con-
42 U.s.c. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). This section also authorizes the government to
issue administrative orders "as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and
the environment." Id. § 106(b) imposes a fine of up to $5,000 for each day of a willful
violation of, or refusal to comply with such an order. Id. § 9606(b). To date, the government
has not made extensive use of its power to issue administrative orders.
A possible response to such orders is found in City and County of Denver v. Ruckelshaus,
No. 83-JM-1043 (D. Colo. filed June 10, 1983). There, a municipality sought to enjoin the
enforcement of an administrative order requiring the city to formulate and implement a
remedial action plan regarding a city-owned site. The city and county alleged that the EPA
did not include all the generators and transporters within the terms of the order and did not
afford the city an opportunity to be heard. Complaint at 6-8, City and County of Denver v.
Ruckelshaus, No 83-JM-1043 (D. Colo. filed June 10, 1983).
"a See e.g., United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 55 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
("Read plainly, Section 106(a) does not appear to create liability in any party. It authorizes
lawsuits and injunctions, but it does not specify what one must do to be subject to suit or
injunction."). The Outboard Marine court concluded that those liable under § 107 were also
liable under § 106. Id. at 57.
16 The term "imminent and substantial endangerment" is not defined in either CERCLA
or RCRA. The same term is likewise present, but left undefined, in other federal environ-
mental statutes. See Clean Water Act, § 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1982); Safe Drinking
Water Act, § 143(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1976); Clean Air Act, § 303(a); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7603(a) (Supp. V 1981). Moreover, the EPA has declined to provide any guidance as to
exactly what constitutes an "imminent and substantial endangerment." See 47 Fed. Reg.
31,180, 31,201 (1982) ("The term is a legal term of art which the courts have interpreted
through a series of cases, and thus, is beyond the scope of the NCP.").
Judicial interpretation of the phrase has been provided in the following: the court in
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982), looked to
the legislative history of the Safe Drinking Water Act in concluding that the risks associated
with the presence of carcinogens and toxic chemicals in groundwater used as a municipal
water supply constituted an imminent and substantial endangerment. Id. at 1109-10; in
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo.
1984), "a substantial likelihood of human and environmental exposure [to dioxin]" was held
to present an imminent and substantial endangerment under CERCLA § 106. Id. at 846.
See also United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 885 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (Di-
oxin escaping from a plant site met the RCRA § 7003 imminent and substantial endanger-
ment standard.).
"' See supra note 111.
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servation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) constituted the principal ju-
risdictional basis for hazardous waste enforcement actions."' This section
permits the EPA to institute an action for injunctive relief where the
"handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid
waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to health or the environment.""' 9 The injunction immediately
may require any person "contributing to" such activities "to stop [the
contributory action] or to take such other action as may be necessary." ''"
At the present time, section 7003 plays only a secondary enforcement role
to the broader provisions of section 106.
1. Persons Liable
On its face, section 106 of CERCLA does not identify the parties who
may come within it scope."' RCRA section 7003, though not a model of
clarity, does provide certain guidelines for determining the extent of po-
tential liability by identifying persons "contributing to" certain activities
as subjects of the enforcement action. However, according to the courts'
interpretations, section 106 affects a broader range of parties than does
section 7003.
Courts have allowed actions under RCRA section 7003 against the cur-
rent or past owners of hazardous waste sites. In United States v. Dia-
mond Shamrock Corp.,12 the section was construed as permitting an ac-
tion for an injunction against a current site owner even though disposal of
wastes at the site had ended in 1972, four years prior to the passage of
RCRA. In United States v. Price"' and United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chemical Corp.,"' section 7003 was also held applicable to former owners
'8 See supra note 2. That section is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. V 1981) and has
been interpreted in numerous decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Ser-
vices, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc.,
484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
Later cases decided under § 7003 held that the provision also created substantive stan-
dards by which liability could be determined. See, e.g., United States v. Diamond Shamrock
Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329 (N.D. Ohio 1981). Similarly, § 106 of CERCLA has
been determined to be a substantive liability creating provision. See, e.g., United States v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
1, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. V 1981). Like § 106 of CERCLA, this provision also au-
thorizes the issuance of administrative orders "as may be necessary to protect public health
and the environment." Id.
120 Id.
" See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
323 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1072 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1109 (D. Minn. 1982). In Reilly Tar, the court also held that § 106
of CERCLA could be invoked against prior owners of disposal sites. Id. at 1113. Other
courts ruling that § 106 applies to the same group of individuals as § 107 imply the same
result. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
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of hazardous waste sites. Recently, in United States v. Waste Industries
Inc., ' 2 5 the court reversed a lower court decision" 6 that section 7003 was
not applicable to the operator of an abandoned waste site, although it did
note that CERCLA applied to inactive hazardous waste sites.1
7
Imposing liability under either CERCLA section 106 or RCRA section
7003 on past off-site generators of hazardous wastes requires a more ex-
pansive interpretation of these provisions, particularly where the injunc-
tive relief would only compel an off-site generator to finance remedial
efforts otherwise payable from the Superfund. Judicial response to the
argument that these sections provide for liability of past off-site genera-
tors has varied. In United States v. Wade,128 the government sought an
injunction under CERCLA section 106(a) and RCRA section 7003(a) to
impose liability upon six off-site generators for expenses incurred and to
be incurred in the cleanup of a site where their wastes had been disposed.
The court held that neither section 106 nor section 7003 could be used to
confer liability on non negligent past off-site generators of hazardous
wastes." 9 To have held otherwise, at least as to section 7003, would have
allowed "no logical limit, given the breadth of the statutory language" to
the number and types of persons upon whom liability might be im-
posed.'3 0 The court noted its astonishment about the fact that the gov-
ernment had ignored CERCLA sections 104 and 107 which would have
allowed remedial action at the site and subsequent recovery of costs.13'
The ruling in Wade which protects nonnegligent off-site generators
from liability under RCRA section 7003 and CERCLA section 106 has not
been followed by other courts. While the court in United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co."' found that section 7003 does
not apply to past nonnegligent off-site generators and transporters,'
33 it
proceeded to hold that section 106(a) does apply to inactive waste dispo-
sal sites and imposes liability upon the same persons who may be held
12 No. 83-1320 (4th Cir. May 16, 1984).
120 United States v. Waste Indus., Inc. 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982), rev'd, No. 83-
1320 (4th Cir. May 16, 1984).
"' The district court had noted that CERCLA applied to inactive hazardous waste sites.
Id. at 1316. See also, United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (S.D. Ill.
1984) (holding that CERCLA § 106 applies to releases from active and inactive waste sites).
128 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983).
129 546 F. Supp. at 788.
o Id. at 790.
Id. at 787. Compare id. (indicating that liability under §§ 106 and 7003 is mutually
exclusive of liability provided by other provisions of CERCLA and RCRA) with United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1110-11, 1114 (D. Minn. 1982) (im-
plying that liability under various provisions of CERCLA and RCRA is not mutually
exclusive).
"" 579 F. Supp. 823.
13 Id. at 833-37.
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liable under section 107.13' The court reasoned that "to read section 104,
106(a) and 107(a) otherwise would be to emasculate the purpose of CER-
CLA and the intent of Congress."'13 5 Apparently on the same rationale,
the court in United States v. Outboard Marine Corp.131 allowed an action
under CERCLA section 106 to continue against a company which had
allegedly created an imminent and substantial endangerment by its past
discharges of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into Lake Michigan. 13 7
Consistent with this trend, United States v. A & F Materials Co.1 3 8 and
United States v. Price"'9 both held that section 106 is applicable to off-
site generators, finding that the liability provisions of section 107 apply to
section 106.140
These recent cases have clearly perceived section 107 as the type of
"logical limit" sought by the court in Wade. However, Congress provided
no express link between section 106 and section 107. From the statutory
language it is not clear that a section 106 action, which is similar to an
action to abate a nuisance, 4 necessarily would reach persons who had
not actively created the hazard. 142 Furthermore, there is no indication
that there exists any legislative history suggesting that result. Rather, sec-
tion 107 is a convenient point of reference, which appears to be the
benchmark for determining who may be held liable under section 106., a
"I' Id. at 839.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
,s 556 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
117 The court noted that "wherever the source of the substantive law to be applied in a
106(a) action, it is most probable that those who would be liable under Section 107 were
intended to be liable in an action under 106(a) for injunctive relief." Id. at 57.
,38 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). The court did rule, however, that RCRA § 7003 did
not extend to off-site generators. Id. at 1258.
139 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983).
"10 A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257-58; Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1113. In Price the
court expressly disagreed with the Wade holding noting that "the language of § 106(a) sug-
gests that liability may arise when a party is shown to be responsible for an ongoing hazard,
even though the site may not be in use." Id. at 1111-12.
... In fact, § 106 is captioned "Abatement Action". 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). It
allows an action "to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat."
Id. Unlike the broader terms "removal" and "remedial action," the terms "abate" and
"abatement" are not defined in the statute. See id. § 9601 (definitional section of
CERCLA).
4 ' At common law, the person who actually creates a nuisance may be held liable regard-
less of where it occurs. Also, one who, either by negligence or design, furnishes means and
facilities for the commission of any injury to another which could not have been done with-
out them is equally responsible in nuisance with the immediate wrongdoer. 66 C.J.S. Nui-
sances §§ 83, 87 (1950).
I's One court has specifically held that a party which does not fall within the classes
established under § 107 can not be held liable for injunctive relieve under section 106. Cad-
illac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 EN'rL. L. R"s. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20376,
20378 (C.D. Cal. March 5, 1984).
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2. Standards of Liability
Just as section 106 fails to identify the parties against whom injunctive
relief may be sought, it also fails to specify what standard of liability the
courts should apply.14 4 The latter is also true for section 7003.14 Absent
any clear instruction in this regard, the courts initially focused on
whether either section 106 or section 7003 was intended to create sub-
stantive liabilities themselves or were merely jurisdictional in nature, i.e.,
authorizing remedies and proceedings but relying upon other sources of
law for their standards."" For example, the court in United States v.
Outboard Marine Corp.,"' questioned whether the federal common law
provided a basis for liability under section 106 because of the apparent
preemption of the federal common law by RCRA." The court denied a
motion to dismiss, finding that the standard of strict liability under sec-
tion 107 most likely is also applicable to section 106.149
In subsequent decisions, the courts in United States v. Price15 0 and
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co." ' held
that the standard under section 106 was the same strict liability standard
applicable to section 107, notwithstanding defendant's argument that a
specific strict liability provision contained in the original Senate bill had
been deleted from the statute as enacted. A strict liability standard has
been held not to apply in the case of RCRA section 7003, however. The
Northeastern Pharmaceutical court concluded that section 7003 did not
apply to past "nonnegligent" generators or transporters of hazardous
wastes and thus retained an apparently different standard for that
statute.5 2
The application of sections 106 and 7003 to an owner or operator of a
hazardous waste site, or an abandoned site through section 106, is consis-
tent with statutory language that is phrased in terms of orders "to abate"
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981); see also United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp.
1103, 113 ("Section 106(a) ... is quite vague and does not discuss any independent stan-
dards of liability with respect to those parties coming within its coverage.").
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. V 1981).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(§ 106); United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329 (N.D.
Ohio 1981) (§ 7003); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138
(N.D. Ind. 1980) § 7003); United States v. Solvent Recovery Services, 496 F. Supp. 1127
(D. Conn. 1980) (§ 7003).
14' 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
148 556 F. Supp. at 55-56. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (discussing pre-
emption of federal common law by federal statutes).
"1 556 F. Supp. at 57.
... 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113.
... 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
'I Id. at 833-37. The Wade court also employed the term "nonnegligent" in limiting gen-
erator liability under § 7003. 546 F. Supp. 785, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713
F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983).
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conditions"'8 or "to stop" activities. 5" Identifying the applicable substan-
tive law in such circumstances may have little bearing upon the result,
since the owner or operator of a facility who has created or allowed an
imminent and substantial endangerment is unlikely to prevail under any
standard. The issue is not as clear, however, in the case of off-site genera-
tors of hazardous wastes where fault may be a genuine issue. That issue
may perhaps be resolved in the context of what "the public interest and
the equities of the case may require."155 In any event, the statute is suffi-
ciently vague that the answer in the case of off-site generators should not
be automatically strict liability.
3. Scope of Injunctive Relief
Section 106 allows an injunction "to abate" an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment, and the court has "jurisdiction to grant such relief as
the public interest and the equities of the case may require. '"6 Similarly,
RCRA section 7003 allows an order "to immediately restrain" or "to
stop" waste disposal and other activities, "or to take such other action as
may be necessary. ' 16 Thus far, decisions concerning the scope of relief
available under these provisions indicate that they are viewed as provid-
ing the courts with far-reaching equitable authority.
In United States v. Price,' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that section 7003 was sufficiently broad to allow an injunction requiring
defendants to fund a diagnostic study of the hazards associated with a
hazardous waste site, and to provide an alternative drinking-water supply
to nearby residents. After considering the statutory language and the rel-
evant legislative history of the section, the court concluded that Congress
clearly intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant affirma-
tive equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risks posed
by toxic wastes."'' 9
In a later ruling in the same litigation, the trial court considered the
-53 CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
I" RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. V 1981).
355 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981); cf. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113 (D. Minn. 1982) (court cites equities of the case in applying § 106
to former owners of hazardous waste site).
1- 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
,51 Id. § 6973(a).
,s' 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 214. In reaching this conclusion, the court disagreed with the trial court's deci-
sion that the relief sought by the government was not an appropriate form of preliminary
injunctive relief under § 7003. In the trial court's view, such relief was essentially a claim
for damages and thus inappropriate in an equitable action. See United States v. Price, 523
F. Supp. 1055, 1067-68 (D.N.J. 1981). The appeals court, however, affirmed the decision of
the trial court because an injunction at that stage of the proceedings would be "impractical
and unfair" in that it would require only a few of the 35 defendants to bear the cost of the
relief. 688 F.2d at 214.
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scope of relief available under section 106 and allowed the government to
seek cleanup of a site from off-site generators. 160 Citing the lack of money
allocated to the Superfund to be used in cleaning up sites, the court
stated that section 106 was "a viable alternative or concurrent means of
achieving the same goal."' 61 Thus "Congress structured section 106(a) in
such a broad fashion as to allow the EPA to at least have a judicial rem-
edy against potentially responsible parties prior to spending taxpayer
money."1
1 2
The court in United States v. A & F Materials Co.,' 6 when discussing
injunctive relief under CERCLA, identified "two limitations in the other-
wise expansive grant of equitable authority to federal courts.' 64 First, the
authority can be exercised only when there is an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment.16 5 The court did not discuss specifically how this limi-
tation would apply in particular cases. 6 " Second, the court observed that
in formulating relief under section 106, it is to be guided by the "equities
of the case."' 67 The court recognized that section 106 authorizes
mandatory injunctive relief, but characterized such relief as "a harsh rem-
edy that must not be granted lightly."''6 Thus, in structuring equitable
relief under this section, "a court must balance the interests of the parties
while remaining cognizant of the practical problems surrounding an
order.""'6
Remedial action ordered under section 106 presumably must also be
cost-effective. This seems implicit in the language of the section that au-
thorizes "such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case
may require.' 176 In addition to whatever limits may be placed upon reme-
dies under section 106 by its own language, such remedies must nonethe-
less be consistent with the National Contingency Plan. Section 105 of
CERCLA provides that the purpose of the Plan is "to reflect and effectu-
'60 United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1112-13 (D.N.J. 1983). Section 106 became
implicated in the litigation when two days before the trial court's decision on the motion
requesting a preliminary injunction under RCRA § 7003, the government amended its com-
plaint by adding claims under § 106. Id. at 1106.
:" Id. at 1112 (footnote omitted).
,62 Id. at 1112 n.9.
578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
Id. at 1258.
"6 Id.
6 See supra note 114 (discussing interpretation of that phrase). Referring to the abate-
ment language of § 106, one might argue that the presence of an imminent and substantial
endangerment, not only is a prerequisite to granting equitable relief under § 106, but also
defines the extent of the remedy to be awarded. Thus a liable party might be ordered to
clean up a site only to the point where an "imminent and substantial endangerment" no
longer exists, rather than to perform a full cleanup of a site.
167 578 F. Supp. at 1258.
166 Id.
169 Id.
170 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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ate the responsibilities and powers created by this Act," including those
created under section 106.'" Moreover, Subpart F of the Plan, revised
and republished as required by section 105, expressly
establishes methods and criteria for determining the appropriate
extent of response authorized by CERCLA when ... there is a
release or substantial threat of a release into the environment of
any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent
and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.'
7
2
As discussed previously,17 1 one of the criteria established under the NCP
is that response actions should be cost-effective. 74
IV. CONCLUSION
Judging by the number of candidates on the National Priority List and
the continuing interest of Congress, it is clear that the courts have not
seen the last of enforcement actions under CERCLA and RCRA. The
cases discussed in this Article, though providing direction for the future,
typically have involved hazardous waste sites ranked at or near the top of
the List due to perceived risks to both human health and the environ-
ment. Arguments of statutory construction have not fared well in these
cases, particularly when the hazards to human health and the environ-
ment were directly traceable to the actions of individual defendants.
Both the poor crafting of the statues and the difficulty in discerning
congressional intent will insure additional judicial scrutiny, particularly
in the area of liability.17 Development of standards for liability under
CERCLA will be a continuing process occurring in a wide range of factual
contexts. Future enforcement actions presumably will involve significant
numbers of off-site waste generators who may validly argue absence of
fault. The perceived risks to health and the environment in future cases
may be far from clear and often hotly contested. Narrow interpretations
of statutory language as to strict liability, joint and several liability, and
the need for cost-effective remedies may produce unexpectedly harsh
results.
Some of the significant issues may ultimately be resolved by Congress.
In the meantime, CERCLA and the RCRA enforcement actions will con-
tinue to be a major subject of litigation in the federal courts.
171 Id. § 9605.
17- 40 C.F.R. § 300.61(a) (1983). The parallelism between the language of this provision
and that of § 106 points to the applicability of the NCP to cleanups under § 106.
'7 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
"' There appears to be no such cost-effectiveness limitation upon remedies granted under
RCRA § 7003.
'6 See supra note 9.
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